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ABSTRACT 
Scholars in International Relations have called for the creation of a Post-Western IR that reflects the 
global and local contexts of the declining power and legitimacy of the West.  Recognizing this discourse 
as indicative of the postcolonial condition, we deploy Homi Bhabha’s concept of mimicry and James 
C. Scott’s notion of mētis to assess whether international political dynamics of a hybrid kind are 
emerging.  Based on interviews with Central Asian political, economic and cultural elites, we explore 
the emergence of a new global politics of a Post-Western type. We find that Russia substantively mimics 
the West as a post-Western power and that there are some suggestive examples of the role of mētis in 
its foreign policy.  Among Central Asian states, the picture is more equivocal.  Formal mimicry and 
mētis of a basic kind are observable, but these nascent forms suggest that the dialectical struggle 
between colonial clientelism and anti-colonial nationalism remains in its early stages.  In this context, 
a post-Western international politics is emerging with a postcolonial aspect but without the emergence 
of the substantive mimicry and hybrid spaces characteristic of established postcolonial relations.                
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The wide-ranging debate over ‘non-Western’ or ‘post-Western’ theories, histories and futures of 
International Relations (IR) has proliferated in recent years.1  Indeed, at first glance, the architecture of 
the whole field seems to have shifted away from its traditional home in the US and Europe, with the 
increasing regionalisation of disciplinary institutions and the inauguration of the ISA South Convention.   
This shift claims a founding empirical reference point in the displacement of power from the purportedly 
hegemonic United States, and its post-1945 and post-1989 iterations of international order, to a new 
multi-polar world where ‘rising powers’, particularly those of Asia, challenge this hegemony and revise 
its order. This debate has produced much deliberation about the state of the discipline and how global, 
universal and scientific we actually are; in particular, Acharya & Buzan’s call for the development of 
‘non-Western IR’2 has elicited a number of responses.3  However, this call, while doubtlessly well-
intentioned, is ontologically and methodologically problematic, not least in its creation of a binary 
distinction between ‘West’ and ‘non-West’, which blinds us to the co-constitution of West and East, 
and North and South, in the emergence of the global. Nor will the transformation and regionalization 
of knowledge production in itself make an American field become global.4              
 
This article takes steps towards developing one possible way of doing a more global and distinctly post-
Western IR that takes into account both the contemporary shifts in power away from the West and the 
legacies of the West in the ways in which international politics is talked about (discourses) and enacted 
(practices). It begins with the recognition that post-Western and postcolonial International Relations 
have much in common: their focus on power relations between dominant and subordinate actors and a 
recognition of the effects of imperial legacies in contemporary international politics. Consequently, we 
offer two concepts drawn from postcolonial theory – Bhabha’s idea of mimicry5 (both formal, that is 
simple imitation, and substantive, that is the adaptation and subversion of imperial models6) and James 
C. Scott’s notion of mētis7 (cunning, knack, practical knowledge) – as means through which to explore 
the overlap between post-Western and postcolonial interactions among state and non-state actors in the 
contemporary international system. Together, mimicry and mētis conceptualise the ways in which 
Western and imperial practices are challenged, re-articulated or subverted by subordinate actors at 
official and everyday levels. Rather than testing a theory with comparative case studies of ‘rising 
powers’, this research is exploratory and oriented towards conceptual development.  
 
Central Asia provides a promising context in which to explore the interplay of post-Western and 
postcolonial relations, since Western powers are weak and in decline, and one of the ‘emerging powers’ 
in the region, Russia, is the former imperial patron.  Therefore, we offer a heuristic approach and 
regionally specific example of how a postcolonially informed post-Western IR works in practice across 
two levels: the global, in the resurgence of Russian power, and the regional, in Central Asian states’ 
relations with their former imperial master.   We highlight Russia’s post-Western features,  as a former 
                                                          
1 Throughout this essay, when referring to the discipline, we either capitalise the words ‘International Relations’ 
or abbreviate them (IR), but leave them uncapitalised when referring to practices of global politics. 
2 Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan, ‘Why is there no non-Western International Relations theory? An 
Introduction’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 7 (2007), pp. 287-312. 
3 Ching-Chang Chen, ‘The Absence of non-Western IR Theory in Asia Reconsidered’, International Relations 
of the Asia-Pacific 11 (2011), pp. 1-23; Kimberly Hutchings, ‘Dialogue between Whom? The Role of the 
West/non-West Distinction in Promoting Global Dialogue in IR’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 
39:3 (2011), pp. 639-347; Andrey Makarychev and Viatcheslav Morozov, ‘Is “Non-Western Theory” Possible? 
The Idea of Multipolarity and the Trap of Epistemological Relativism in Russian IR’, International Studies 
Review 15 (2013), pp. 328-350. 
4 Ole Wæver and Arlene Tickner, “Introduction: Geocultural Epistemologies” in Arlene Tickner and Ole Wæver 
(eds.) International Relations Scholarship around the World: Worlding beyond the West, (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2009), p. 10. 
5 Homi Bhabha, The Location of Culture, (Abingdon: Routledge, 1994). 
6 L.H.M. Ling, ‘Chapter 5: Cultural Chauvinism and the Liberal International Order: “West Versus Rest” in 
Asia’s Financial Crisis’ in Chowdhry Geeta and Sheila Nair (eds.), Power, Postcolonialism and International 
Relations: Reading Race, Gender and Class, (Oxford: Routledge, 2004). 
7 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 
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European-centred empire that shifted from formal to substantive mimicry of the West in the post-Soviet 
period, which also relies on the formal mimicry and mētis developed with Central Asia in the cultural 
and institutional continuities of the Soviet Union.  We sketch Central Asia as post-Western space of 
global politics, in part, because of its post-colonial relations with Russia. However, our analysis shows 
that the practices of postcolonial international relations do not map neatly onto those of post-Western 
international relations: mimicry is most substantive when deployed by Russia vis-à-vis the West, while 
formal mimicry and mētis allow Central Asians to evade post-imperial domination. The use of mimicry 
and mētis, ‘rising powers’ and post-Western IR must be seen not merely in terms of current and future 
trajectories but in their imperial and colonial pasts.  Our study highlights the importance of investigating 
global politics through Area Studies, whose ethnographic orientation may highlight these continuities 
and provide empirically grounded theoretical tools for exploring the degree and kind of postcolonial, 
post-Western relations.8    
 
The article draws on fieldwork conducted in 2013-14 in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia.  The 
republics of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the smallest, poorest and most dependent post-Soviet states 
and are most likely to illustrate the postcolonial dynamics we seek to explore. Thirty-eight semi-
structured interviews with Kyrgyz and Tajik business persons, officials and cultural elites, as well as 
Russian elites, were analysed via two approaches to coding.  Firstly, we undertook an initial survey 
with NVivo software to identify the most prevalent ‘nodes’ of the discourse about Russia in Central 
Asia.  Secondly, we adopted manual coding to specify aspects of mimicry and mētis as reported by 
native and Russian elites. Most interviews were conducted in Russian, the language of empire that 
remains the lingua franca of the region. Examples are supplemented with findings from our wider 
research on state institutions, conflict management and security affairs in the post-Soviet region.   
 
The paper is structured as follows. The first section considers three approaches to the contemporary 
power shifts in the international system, and argues for a postcolonially informed post-Western IR. The 
second section elaborates mimicry and mētis as tools for uncovering postcolonial, post-Western 
international relations. The third section sets out Russia as a post-Western and post-imperial power, and 
highlights its use of substantive mimicry and mētis of the Western-founded global order. The fourth 
and final section explores discourses and reported practices of formal mimicry and mētis in the post-
Western and post-colonial relations of Russia in Central Asia.  
  
The Place of the West in Contemporary IR 
In the shadow of the emergence of ‘rising powers’ and the question of the universality of social science, 
the debate over the position of the West in a global IR has elicited a plethora of responses.  These range 
from those that doubt or place caveats upon the decline of Western powers, norms and institutions9 to 
doom-mongers of the coming ‘age of disorder’ and proponents of the ‘China threat’ thesis.10  Many of 
these responses can be tied genealogically to the debate over the ‘unipolar moment’ between realists 
and liberals.11  Other scholars have sought to argue for ‘non-Western IR’ as a mode of inquiry with 
                                                          
8 See Joseph MacKay and Jamie Levin, “Hanging Out in International Politics: Two Kinds of Explanatory 
Political Ethnography for IR”, International Studies Review 17 (2015), pp. 163–188; Wanda Vrasti, “The 
Strange Case of Ethnography and International Relations”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 37:2 
(2008), pp. 279–301. 
9 Barry Buzan, ‘China in International Society: Is “Peaceful Rise” Possible?’ The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics, 3 (2010), pp. 5-36; Michael Cox, ‘Power Shifts, Economic Change and the Decline of the 
West?’ International Relations 26:4 (2012), pp. 369-388; G. John Ikenberry. ‘The Future of the Liberal World 
Order: Internationalism after America’, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2011. 
10 Randall Schweller, ‘Emerging Powers in an Age of Disorder’, Global Governance 17:3 (2011), pp. 285-297. 
11 A sub-set of this group are empiricists who deploy the rise/fall monikers as a foil for data-driven analyses of 
power and/or institutions, typically discovering a mixed picture, but nonetheless one that presents the ‘rise’ of 
Asia as a ‘threat’ to the foundations of liberal internationalism. This camp includes much work in IPE, both 
historical materialist and moderate constructivist. See Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The End of 
the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order, 2nd Edition, (London: Penguin, 2012); Miles Kahler, 
‘Rising Powers and Global Governance: Negotiating Change in a Resilient Status Quo’, International Affairs 
89:3 (2013), pp. 711-729; Christopher Layne, ‘This Time it’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax 
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theoretical terms and empirical objects that are not tainted by Western theories or themes deemed overly 
narrow or even ‘racist’.12  This camp includes those trying to pluralize the study of international politics 
and those asserting its particularization in national schools of comparative IR theory,13 some of which 
have essentialist overtones.14  A third group of scholars have advanced a ‘post-Western’ approach which 
seeks to develop a global study of IR, rather than a cluster of incommensurable regional approaches.15 
This approach is supported by a number of works on the history of IR, which demonstrate that concepts 
of world politics that extend across regions and cultures may be unearthed through comparative 
historical examination. 
 
Postcolonial theorists have observed that some responses to the rise of non-Western powers, particularly 
those from the policy world, are rooted in an ethno-centrism in which the rise of the Other can only be 
understood as a challenge to the Self.16  Here, debates about Rising Powers and their challenge to the 
system begin and end in these self-referential terms.  For example, attempts at both ‘saving [the concept 
of] liberal peacebuilding’ and condemning it to an over-due demise both suffer from a profound Western 
bias.17  They both fail to capture the actual power dynamics by which certain contexts become more or 
less violent and fall short of assessing how and why certain non-Western interveners, notably Russia, 
have become more active.  The debate is necessarily framed in terms of a perceived challenge to a 
putative Western norm, institution or economic practice.  However, neither is the thesis (the Liberal 
Peace) entirely Western, nor the counter-thesis (the Post-Liberal Peace) entirely non-Western.  West 
versus non-West is simply an unhelpful framing of a debate which takes place at a global level, but 
where former imperial powers have hitherto set an agenda for former colonies. 
 
This empirical problem is mirrored in theoretical debates.  Non-Western approaches purport to offer a 
pluralist alternative whereby multiple national and regional schools of IR produce different conceptions 
of international order; in the comparative study of these schools we begin to approach, but never reach, 
a single, global IR. In his earlier work, Acharya argued that International Relations should locate 
‘alternative theories’ of global politics whose ontological roots lie in the Global South.18 Methods for 
the development of such theories include the incorporation of regional political philosophers, politicians 
                                                          
Americana’, International Studies Quarterly 56 (2012), pp. 203-213; Hugh White, The China Choice: Why We 
Should Share Power, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Matthew Stephen ‘Rising Powers, Global 
Capitalism and Liberal Governance: A Historical Materialist Account of the BRICS Challenge’, European 
Journal of International Relations 20:4 (2014), pp. 912-938.  
12 Acharya and Buzan, ‘Why is there no non-Western International Relations theory?’; Amitav Acharya, 
‘Dialogue and Discovery: In Search of International Relations Theories Beyond the West’, Millennium: Journal 
of International Studies 39:3 (2011), pp. 619-637; John Hobson, ‘Is Critical Theory always for the white West 
and for Western imperialism? Beyond Westphilian towards a post-racist critical IR’, Review of International 
Studies 33 (2007), pp. 91-116. 
13 The distinction between Pluralists and Particularists is made by Rosa Vasilaki, ‘Provincialising IR? Deadlocks 
and Prospects in Post-Western IR Theory’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 41:3 (2012), pp. 3-22. 
14 Makarychev and Morozov, ‘Is “Non-Western” Theory Possible?’; Yaqing Qin, ‘Why is there no Chinese 
International Relations Theory?’ International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 7 (2007), pp. 313-340; Andrei 
Tsygankov and Pavel Tsygankov, ‘National Ideology and IR Theory: Three Incarnations of the “Russian Idea”’, 
European Journal of International Relations 16:4 (2010), pp. 663-686; Gregorio Shani, ‘Towards a Post-
Western IR: The Umma, Khalsa Panth, and Critical International Relations Theory’, International Studies 
Review 10 (2008), pp. 722-734 (who confuses matters by denoting non-Western IR as (proper, valid) ‘Post-
Western IR’). 
15 Chen, ‘The Absence of non-Western IR Theory in Asia Reconsidered’; Hutchings, ‘Dialogue Between 
Whom?’; L.H.M. Ling, ‘Worlds Beyond Westphalia: Daoist Dialectics and the “China Threat”’, Review of 
International Studies 39:3 (2013), pp. 549-568. 
16 Ling, ‘Worlds Beyond Westphalia, pp. 554-5. 
17 Roland Paris, ‘Saving Liberal Peacebuilding’, Review of International Studies, 6:2 (2010), pp 337-365. (See 
also Meera Sabaratnam, ‘Avatars of Eurocentrism in the critique of the liberal peace’, Security Dialogue, 44:3 
(2013), p. 260; Oliver Richmond and Roger Mac Ginty, ‘Where now for the critique of the liberal peace?’ 
Cooperation and Conflict, published online, 20 August 2014, p. 7.) 
18 Acharya, ‘Dialogue and Discovery’. 
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or historical experiences into the construction of new theories.19   The IR literature now contains 
numerous attempts to develop new concepts or theories through national or regional schools in BRIC 
states.20   Although Acharya was attentive to the dangers of parochialism wrought by an increasingly 
regional perspective, it is difficult to see how competing particularisms could be overcome and a 
genuinely global account of world politics be achieved.21  
 
In sum, the promotion of ‘non-Western’ IR, while commendable in its intentions, has several problems. 
First, it may lead to a dangerous relativism whereby national schools become incommensurable with 
one another and no global dialogue is possible. Ling hints at this possibility with her elaboration of a 
Daoist approach to world politics, since the Chinese philosophy has no referents in Western discourse.22 
How could global problems such as climate change or economic inequality be discussed at the 
international level – let alone addressed – without a unifying ontology of world politics? As Vasilaki 
argues,  
 
IR – or any other field for that matter – is not getting post-Westernised or decolonised, and in that sense 
less hierarchical, by simply opening an intellectual space where more non-Western views can be aired 
(pluralism) or because various forms of particularisms (local or cultural IR) are elevated into 
universalisms’.23 
 
Second, the concept ‘non-Western’ relies on problematic binary thinking that does not reflect the nature 
of ‘West’ and ‘non-West’ as mutually constitutive subjectivities over history. As Bilgin has pointed 
out, ‘“Western” and “non-Western” dynamics as well as their interpretations have, over the years, 
clashed and fused in far too many different ways’ for mutually exclusive categories to be reflective of 
reality.24 Further, when framed in these binary terms, IR is about Us and Them; as such, it remains a 
self-referential project.  Third, the creation of national or regional schools of IR has the potential to lead 
to a crass ethno-centrism, which associates certain types of thinking about and doing politics with the 
cultural traits of specific geographical regions.25  It is important not to assume or overstate the influence 
of, say, the Qing era tributary system on contemporary Chinese foreign policy or Ghandian pacifism on 
Indian contemporary international behaviour. Numerous studies have emphasised rising powers’ 
‘pragmatic’ approach to international affairs, rather than behaviour fuelled by any alternative 
ideology.26  Fourth, the attempt  to ‘democratise’ the field by requiring that ‘non-Western’ academia 
conduct its own version of IR does not dislodge Western hegemony as it forces the non-Western 
academy into the permanently subordinate position of playing ‘catch-up’.  
 
Acharya’s recent work considers these criticisms and now casts the empirical and theoretical shift in 
post-Western terms. Joining Ling and Bilgin in an International Studies Association presidential special 
issue of International Studies Review on Global IR, Acharya argues against the current state of the field 
                                                          
19 Acharya and Buzan, ‘Why is there no non-Western International Relations Theory’? 
20 Makarychev and Morozov, ‘Is “non-Western” Theory Possible?’; Qin, ‘Why is there no Chinese International 
Relations Theory?’; Tsyagnakov and Tsyagankov, ‘National Ideology and IR Theory’; Shani, ‘Towards a post-
Western IR’. 
21 Acharya, ‘Dialogue and Discovery’; Amitav Acharya, ‘Global International Relations and Regional Worlds: 
A New Agenda for International Studies’, International Studies Quarterly 58 (2014), pp. 647-659. 
22 Ling, ‘Worlds beyond Westphalia’, p.7 
23 Vasilaki, ‘Provincialising IR?’ 
24 Pinar Bilgin, ‘Thinking Past “Western” IR’, Third World Quarterly 29:1 (2008), pp. 5-23. 
25 Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney, International Relations and the Problem of Difference, (London: 
Routledge, 2004), pp. 12. 
26 Navnita Chadha Behera, ‘Re-imagining IR in India’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 7 (2007), pp. 
341-368; Robert Sutter, Chinese Foreign Relations: Power and Policy since the Cold War, Third Edition, 
(Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012); Ivan Campbell, Thomas Wheeler, Larry Attree, Dell Marie Butler 
and Bernado Mariani, China and Conflict Affected States: Between Principle and Pragmatism, Saferworld 
Report 2012; Shaun Breslin, ‘China and the Global Order: Signalling Threat or Friendship?’ International 
Affairs 89:3 (2013), pp. 615-634; Amrita Narlikar, ‘India Rising: Responsible to Whom?’ International Affairs, 
89:3 (2013), pp. 595-614. 
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with Western scholars ‘largely doing the theoretical work’ while non-Western regional specialists 
provide the ‘raw data’.27  He challenges a second generation of scholars seeking to develop a Global IR 
in post-Western terms, ‘to demonstrate that concepts and theories derived from the non-Western or 
Global South contexts can also apply beyond that specific national or regional context from which they 
are initially derived’.28  This article takes up his challenge.  Hurrell states, in the ISR edition’s forum, 
that ‘the crucial first step is to recognize that dominant concepts and ideas never travel 
unproblematically’.29  Novel concepts may be required but so is a recognition that all concepts in global 
IR are ‘travelling concepts’; many have travelled through colonised worlds and (post)colonial times.30 
 
This point is demonstrated in some of historical IR of the non-West, particularly of East Asia.31 Most 
of this literature suggests that there were in fact commensurable social and political processes occurring 
in early modern East Asia and Europe, which can be analysed in a common framework.32 Victoria Tin-
Bor Hui shows that similar domestic and international processes of governance were occurring around 
the same time in early modern Europe and Qin-era China, such as the emergence of territorially bound 
sovereign units, the development of bureaucracy and the concept of balance of power.33 In a similar 
vein, Andrew Philipps argues that the transformation of both Christendom and the Sinosphere were 
driven by a combination of similar domestic and external factors, including institutional decay, the 
emergence of anti-systemic ideologies and increases in violence.34 Alastair Johnson’s study of Chinese 
military engagements with the Mongols during the Ming Dynasty suggests that they were not so 
different from European realpolitik of parabellum, a finding corroborated by Ji-Young Lee’s study of 
the Qing-era tribute system.35 Taking an English School approach, Yongjin Zhang and Barry Buzan 
argue that the tribute system demonstrates the existence of a form of international society in East Asia 
since participation therein indicates acceptance of the structure and its mode of participation.36 Applying 
the English School to the Russian case, Filippo Costa Buranelli problematises the West/rest dichotomy 
by showing how Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War compelled European international society to view 
the country as a ‘non-Western’ power, despite Russia’s desire to conform to European standards of 
‘civilization’.37 Studies such as these suggest that concepts of world politics that can travel across 
cultures may be found through comparative historical analysis and appreciation of the common legacies 
of regional power asymmetries.  
                                                          
27 Amitav Acharya, ‘Advancing Global IR: Challenges, Contentions and Contributions’, International Studies 
Review, 18:1 (2016), p. 5. 
28 Acharya, ‘Advancing Global IR’, p. 14. 
29 Andrew Hurrell, ‘Beyond Critique? How to Study Global IR’, International Studies Review, 18:1 (2016), p. 
151. 
30 See Mieke Bal, Travelling Concepts in the Humanities: A Rough Guide, (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2002); Michael C. Frank, ‘Imaginative Geography as a Travelling Concept: Foucault, Saïd and the Spatial 
Turn’, European Journal of English Studies, 13:1 (2009), pp. 61-77. 
31 The authors wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for directing them to this literature. 
32 Not all scholars of historical IR adhere to this view. For instance, David Kang contrasts the Chinese tribute 
system, which ensured five centuries of peaceful international relations with Korea, Japan and Vietnam through 
Confucian hierarchical relations, with the Westphalian system that developed in Europe and relied on balance of 
power between formally equal, sovereign entities. See David Kang, East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries 
of Trade and Tribute, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010). 
33 Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
34 Andrew Phillips, War, Religion and Empire: The Transformation of International Orders, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
35 Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Ming China, (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Ji-Young Lee, China’s Hegemony: Four Hundred Years of East Asian 
Domination, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016). 
36 Zhang Yongjin and Barry Buzan, ‘The Tributary System as International Society in Theory and Practice’, 
Chinese Journal of International Politics, 5:1 (2012). 
37 Filippo Costa Buranelli, ‘Knockin’ on Heaven’s Door: Russia, Central Asia and the Mediated Expansion of 
International Society’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 42:3 (2014), pp. 817-836. A similar point 
is made by Iver B. Neumann and Vincent Pouliot, ‘Untimely Russia: Hysteresis in Russian-Western Relations 
over the Past Millennium’, Security Studies, 20:1 (2011), pp. 105-137. 
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We situate ourselves alongside, first, those who contend that it is possible to locate and employ concepts 
that travel across cultures and époques, and, second, those who argue that the post-Western puzzle must 
be considered alongside the postcolonial question in the study of IR.  A postcolonially informed post-
Western IR, therefore, entails the study of the global and dialectical condition of the relative decline of 
Western powers, observable in practice and interpreted through discourse, not their replacement by or 
competition with non-Western alternatives.  This requires recognition of the discipline’s colonial 
origins and the requirement to question ethnocentric or ahistorical usages of concepts of international 
order, hegemony and even ‘emerging’ or ‘rising’ powers.38 While, as we demonstrate below, 
postcolonial and post-Western international relations are not identical, what they share is an 
acknowledgement of both the interconnections between actors, institutions and discourses in different 
regions, and the international power asymmetries that have produced (and continue to produce) global 
hierarchies.  Adherents to this approach self-consciously seek new categories that ‘foreground human 
experiences of violence and poverty, political action and cultural renewal, in spaces not confined by 
nation-state boundaries,’39 which may be drawn from Western or non-Western scholarship.40  Their 
value is found not in their ascribed origin but in their revealing of the extant power relations patterned 
into global politics and practiced by amalgams of Western and Eastern, Northern and Southern actors.  
The following section elaborates two concepts that might assist us to disentangle postcolonial and post-
Western international relations – Bhabha’s ‘mimicry’ (expanded, following Ling, to comprise both 
‘formal’ and ‘substantive’ aspects) and Scott’s ‘mētis’. 
 
Mimicry and Mētis: towards a postcolonial approach to post-Western IR 
Like the effects of the coloniser on the colonised, post-Western international relations exhibit 
countervailing tendencies – assimilation with, hybridisation of, and resistance to the existing discourses, 
practices and institutions of global politics.  Taken together, mimicry and mētis enable us to probe these 
tendencies. They foreground the ways in which postcolonial (and post-Western) subjects discursively 
represent and practically realise relations with former and prospective imperial masters (or 
regional/global hegemons), both at the official level or public transcript, in the case of mimicry, and at 
an unofficial level or hidden transcript, in the case of mētis. 
  
Mimicry as a form of agency under colonial conditions was originally conceptualised by cultural 
theorist Homi K. Bhabha. For Bhabha, colonial mimicry refers to ‘the desire for a reformed, 
recognizable Other, as a subject of a difference which is almost the same, but not quite’ and its practices 
constitute colonial ‘traditions of trompe-l’œil, irony, mimicry and repetition’ between imperial Self and 
colonised Other.41  An exploration of colonial mimicry as a form of agency begins with the assumption 
that ‘the place of difference and otherness, or the space of the adversarial… is never entirely on the 
outside or implacably oppositional’.42 Thus, in contrast to out-right resistance, mimicry challenges the 
colonial power base of the hegemon or coloniser by appropriating and subverting its discourses or 
behaviour. Although it implies outward and formal adherence, colonial mimicry enables subordinate 
actors subtly to shape the agenda of dominant actors, thereby revealing how the latter are in fact 
dependent on the former.  
 
The concept of mimicry has hitherto been systematically employed in International Relations in two 
main ways. The first situates it within the norm-diffusion literature and conceives of mimicry as a 
broadly consensual activity: a step towards socialisation into the international system.43 Since this group 
                                                          
38 Branwen Gruffydd Jones, Decolonizing International Relations, (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006). 
39 Lucy Taylor, ‘Decolonizing International Relations: Perspectives from Latin America’, International Studies 
Review 14 (2012), pp. 386-400. 
40 Ling, ‘Worlds beyond Westphalia’, p. 556. 
41 Bhabha, The Location of Culture, p. 122. 
42 Homi Bhabha, ‘Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of ambivalence and authority under a tree outside Delhi, 
May 1817’, Critical Inquiry 12 (1985). 
43 Alasdair Ian Johnston, Social States: China in International Institutions 1980-2000, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008); Alan Collins, ‘Norm Diffusion and ASEAN’s Adoption and Adaption of Global 
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does not conceive of mimicry as a necessarily postcolonial or post-Western activity, it is of little 
relevance to our study. The second approach draws explicitly on Bhabha to explore the ways in which 
states are challenging the hegemony of Western ‘international’ practices and institutions. Bilgin 
considers India’s development of the nuclear bomb, Turkey’s policy of secularisation in the 1920s and 
Asia’s integration into the Western-led international society of states, in each case offering an 
explanation of their ‘mimicry’ of Western statehood that also implies a subversion/tailoring of it to suit 
their postcolonial realities.44 In the context of IPE, John Hobson and Leonard Seabrooke have developed 
the concept of ‘mimetic challenge’, which refers to the ways in which ‘everyday actors adopt the 
discourse and/or characteristics of the dominant to cloak their resistance-challenges to the legitimacy 
of the dominant’.45  
 
Most importantly for the present study, L.H.M. Ling has distinguished two levels of mimicry: ‘formal 
mimicry’ comprises superficial emulation, while ‘substantive mimicry’ refers to a deeper level of 
engagement that produces a hybridised set of practices and identities.46 Both levels of mimicry 
destabilise colonial relations, but formal mimicry invites ‘amusement, tolerance, even encouragement’ 
while substantive mimicry elicits a disciplinary action, since the postcolonial subject is now competing 
with the hegemon.47 Ling’s two conceptualisations present mimicry as a means of reclaiming politics 
on the part of the subordinate; however, substantive mimicry represents well-established postcolonial 
relations while ‘formal mimicry’ is merely emergent.  In our view, these levels of mimicry constitute a 
fruitful avenue to explore post-Western international relations because they require an understanding of 
both the Western/imperial projects themselves and the extents to which subordinates have the power to 
erode and undermine them. We employ Ling’s distinction in our analysis below.  
 
However, a focus on types of mimicry alone is insufficient to capture the variety of cultural, economic 
and political actions that compose post-Western international politics. As scholars of social movements 
have demonstrated, citizens’ campaigns, grassroots organisations and other less formal groups have a 
considerable effect on global politics.48 Thus, as formal and substantive mimicries capture postcolonial 
elite discourse and practices in public, James C. Scott’s conception of mētis concerns the vernacular 
moral economy.  For Scott, ‘public transcripts’ of conformity and unity – such as those conceptualised 
in mimicry – offer ‘an indifferent guide to the opinion of subordinates’.49 Thus, he introduces the idea 
of a ‘hidden transcript’ that is ‘beyond direct observation by powerholders’.50 A hidden, alternative 
reality – ‘an extensive offstage social existence’ – is sustained by what Scott calls ‘the infrapolitics of 
subordinate groups’.51 His Seeing Like a State highlights how attempts to impose ‘high-modernist’ 
ideologies – from Soviet collectivism to Brazilian city-planning – onto various societies have been 
defeated by ‘cunning’ and ‘practical knowledge’ that he denotes with the Greek term mētis – a quality 
attributed to the wily Odysseus in the Trojan wars.52  Mētis, in Scott’s usage is synonymous with 
‘common sense, experience, a knack’, and is best observed at the local level, in craftsmanship and 
schemes of corruption, in attempts to maintain virtue and attempts to exploit it.  
                                                          
HIV/AIDS Norms’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 13 (2013); See Seng Tan, ‘Herding Cats: The 
Role of Persuasion in Political Change and Continuity in the Association of South-East Asian Nations’, 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 13:2 (2013), pp. 233-265; Peter Ferdinand and Jue Wang, ‘China 
and the IMF: From Mimicry to Pragmatic International Institutional Pluralism’, International Affairs, 89:4 
(2013), pp. 895-910. 
44 Bilgin, ‘Thinking past “Western” IR’. 
45 John Hobson and Leonard Seabrooke, ‘Chapter 1: Everyday IPE: Revealing Everyday Forms of Change in the 
World Economy’ in John Hobson and Leonard Seabrooke (eds.) Everyday Politics of the World Economy, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 17. 
46  Ling in Chowdhry and Nair (eds.), Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations. 
47 Ibid., p. 117. See also L.H.M. Ling, Postcolonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire Between Asia 
and the West (London: Palgrave, 2002); Ling, Huang and Chen, ‘Subaltern Straits’. 
48 David West, Social Movements in Global Politics, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013). 
49 James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, (New Haven: Yale, 1990), p. 3. 
50 Ibid., p. 4. 
51 Ibid., p. 21. 
52 Scott, Seeing Like a State, p. 6, 313. 
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Scott is widely cited across disciplines, especially in Asian Studies, but his use in International Relations 
has, surprisingly, been limited. Moreover, his relevance to postcolonial analysis is questionable given 
his general conception of the state as a modernist institution.  Some justification of his deployment here 
is therefore required. Sabaratnam defends Scott’s work as consistent with anti-colonial thinking, insofar 
as it ‘gives us a handle on how to think about the history of political rule that does not naturalise 
authority but points to its location in contested relations’.53 Philips makes a similar argument, from the 
perspective of Global History and in a manner consistent with Scott’s mētis, that ‘European colonialism 
was the product of extensive collaboration with local intermediaries’.54 It was therefore changed and 
adapted by the cunning and know-how of native elites with whom it collaborated.  This is what Acharya 
denotes as ‘localization’55 and Philips similarly identifies as ‘customization’.56 ‘Indigenous material, 
institutional, and normative resources,’ Philips notes, ‘provided the raw materials out of which colonial 
hierarchies were constructed’.57 Like mimicry, mētis works both for and against imperial practices.  It 
works for neo-colonial orders in that it is functional to the continuance of power relations.  As Scott 
says, high modernism is always parasitic upon mētis, without which imperial projects would be 
powerless at the micro-level.  However, mētis works against imperial practices and for the emergence 
of postcolonial hybridities in the self-consciousness it protects and the resources it re-appropriates from 
empire.58  This is not to say that there is something essentially democratic in mētis, which may work 
either for hierarchy or for anarchy.  
 
Where mētis has been used in IR has been in the analysis of international intervention. Whilst lacking 
the explicit authoritarianism of many of Scott’s examples, national and international statebuilding 
projects nevertheless exhibit many high-modernist features and are routinely defeated or diverted – or, 
alternatively, made to work in specific contexts – by practical knowledge.59 The cognate concept of 
‘tactics’ in the work of Michel de Certeau has also been deployed widely by critical scholars of 
statebuilding.60  Such projects frequently only work if the power of the central state is instantiated in 
local patron-client relations at the periphery and national economies of resource capture are 
supplemented by localized asset grabs and livelihoods strategies.61 It should be no surprise that mētis is 
a defining characteristic of subaltern behaviour in former socialist states where, as the popular phrase 
goes, ‘we pretend to work and they pretend to pay us’.  
 
Together, mimicry and mētis reflect the postcolonial condition of East-West mimetic rivalry and elite 
networks of rent-seeking. They suggest that colonised, post-colonial and subordinate actors are not 
passive receptors of imperial/neo-imperial projects, but are able to disrupt and appropriate those projects 
for their own ends, both at the institutional and everyday levels. Bhavna Dave’s ‘four crucial insights 
of postcolonial and subaltern theory’ invoke the dynamics of mimicry and mētis. Mimicry is visible in 
                                                          
53 Meera Sabaratnam, Rethinking the liberal peace: anti-colonial thought and post-war intervention in 
Mozambique, PhD dissertation, London School of Economics (2011), p. 156. 
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55 Amitav Acharya, ‘How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in 
Asian Regionalism’, International Organization 58:2 (2004), pp. 239–75. 
56 Philips, ‘Global IR Meets Global History’. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Scott, Seeing Like a State, p. 340. 
59 John Heathershaw, Post-Conflict Tajikistan: the politics of peacebuilding and the emergence of legitimate 
order, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009); Sabaratnam, Rethinking the Liberal Peace; Marta Iñiguez de Heredia, 
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‘a new ontology and vocabulary of nation and statehood’ and the fact that independent statehood is not 
the culmination of nationhood but ‘only a starting point’ – one bequeathed by Soviet borders and 
institutions.62  Mētis is present in the ‘collaboration of native elites with the colonial order’ and ‘the 
contestations between [elite and popular] domains in both colonial and postcolonial contexts’.63  In this 
light, the relationship between mimicry and mētis is not so much dialectical as symbiotic. The following 
two sections explore the extent to which these two concepts can reveal postcolonial aspects of post-
Western international relations at global and regional levels. 
 
Post-Soviet Russia: from pro-Western to post-Western 
Contemporary Russia may be the post-Western power par excellence, with its leaders vociferously 
arguing against the Western-led international order in recent years,64 after centuries of  domestic 
equivocation between Europhile (or ‘Westernising’) and Slavophile elements.65  Whether current global 
power shifts away from the West towards Asia will set Russia’s severely marginalised Westernising 
forces in terminal decline remains to be seen, but for now relations between Russia and the West are at 
an historic low, while Russian co-operation with non-Western powers such as China and Iran is 
growing. However, Russia’s post-Western status should not be confused with the position of its 
Eurasianist scholars, who have been ‘using a culturalist terminology to argue that Russia has a Eurasian 
essence’.66 In contrast to such normative essentialism, which espouses a set of timeless, inherent, 
cultural attributes that Russia should develop and inculcate, ‘post-Western’ refers to a temporally 
contingent set of relations between Russia (or indeed any other power) and the Western-led international 
order, which, as we show below, involve shifts from formal to substantive mimicry. This section 
presents Russia as a post-Western power by summarising the decline of its formal mimicry of Western 
discourses and practices before showing how it employs postcolonial practices of substantive mimicry 
and mētis in order to challenge and undermine Western global dominance. 
 
In the aftermath of Soviet collapse, the Westernisation of Russia seemed practically inevitable, as the 
country’s leadership professed unreserved support for the Western-oriented reform agenda. Foreign 
minister Andrey Kozyrev described Russia and the West as ‘natural friends and eventual allies’,67 liberal 
reformers were in charge of the economy, and Boris Yeltsin presided over a national strategy that 
prioritised integration with the West even above the countries of the former Soviet bloc.68 This 
orientation towards the West can be conceptualised as formal mimicry, whereby, following Ling, ‘a 
country without an indigenous liberal tradition… adopts an imposed or borrowed liberal ideology of 
limited state and unfettered market’, which remains ‘dichotomised, superficial, contradictory and 
forever emulative’.69  Indeed, domestic economic reforms did not progress in the way the Russian 
democrats envisaged. Advisers at the IMF and the US treasury were quick to advocate principles of 
price liberalisation and privatisation, but did not attempt to build the social institutions that would 
support these mechanisms and ensure they could operate under popular control.70 Internationally, the 
expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe during the mid-1990s appeared to demonstrate to Russia that 
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the West considered its Cold War-era instruments of defence still necessary. The West’s abandonment 
of Russia during this reform period has been described as ‘a folly comparable with that of Georges 
Clemenceau at Versailles or Neville Chamberlain at Munich’.71 Already in 1992, Kozyrev was forced 
to announce the end of the “honeymoon period” with the West and, in 1995, his replacement with 
Yevgeny Primakov completed the shift away from a formally pro-Western orientation and the move 
towards Russia as a ‘Eurasian’ power with aspirations to Great Power status.72  
 
From the 2000s onwards, Russian policy continued to distance itself from West, driven by fears of 
domestic regime change via Western-funded NGOs (the notorious ‘Colour Revolutions’) and the 
relentless eastward expansion of NATO.73 In 2008, Russia’s six-day war with Georgia demonstrated 
that it would not tolerate NATO encroachment in its ‘near abroad’ and would be prepared to challenge 
the European security architecture that had progressively marginalised Russia since Soviet collapse.  
Likewise, the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing crisis in Syria have both demonstrated the 
extents to which Russia is prepared to go in order to counter what it perceives as Western attempts at 
domestic regime change.74 Russia’s military conquests of the last decade appear to have demonstrated 
Thakur’s assertion that ‘Westerners have lost their previous capacity to set standards and rules of 
behaviour for the world’.75  
 
Despite Russia’s ostensibly anti-Western stance, some scholars have emphasised its continuing 
Eurocentrism. Viatcheslav Morozov highlights Russia’s unique position in the international system that 
consists of ‘a subaltern condition fraught with an imperial legacy’.76 He uses Bhabha’s formulation of 
the Master and Slave to illustrate how Russia simultaneously appropriates and resists Western norms 
and practices of global politics. ‘While opposing the West’, Morozov states, ‘Russia nevertheless 
frames its own demands in the Western language of democracy’.77  Similarly, Ayşe Zarakol argues that 
Russia has always been an outsider state, caught between attraction to and rejection of the Western-
dominated international system. Particularly in the post-Soviet period, the on-going stigmatisation of 
Russia by the West as inferior fuelled its ostensible rejection of a pro-Western agenda. Yet, ‘even at the 
peak of its post-defeat economic prowess, Russia has not been able to reject the norms of the 
international order this time round’.78 Although neither author refers to Russia in post-Western or 
postcolonial terms, these formulations nevertheless recall the spirit of substantive mimicry elaborated 
by Ling. We argue that the transformation of Russia to a post-Western power began as the formal 
mimicry of the West in the early 1990s transformed into substantive mimicry in the 2000s discussed 
below. 
 
Substantive Mimicry in Russia’s Relations with the West 
Russia’s post-Western status is discernible in its substantive mimicry of Western discourse and 
institutional formations, which produces hybridisations that expose the weaknesses of the Western 
liberal project and its perceived moral authority in the international system. In terms of discourse, Russia 
has employed Western concepts to shift power away from the West in attempts to build a multi-polar 
world order. Vladislav Surkov’s articulation of ‘sovereign democracy’ aimed both to provide a 
legitimating concept for Putin’s government and to guarantee Russia’s independence in a globalising 
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international system.79  In the cases of the Russia-Georgia War, the Russian war in Ukraine and the 
ongoing Russian intervention in Syria, the Western concept ‘responsibility to protect’ has been invoked 
to justify military activities that diverged from Western norms and challenged Western power.80 
Similarly, Russia has mimicked Western cross-national human rights rankings by producing their own 
document showcasing Western countries’ domestic human rights abuses.81  This mimicry not only 
serves to provide a legitimating narrative for Russian activities that is difficult for the West to criticise, 
but its use in situations that challenge the Western normative order also exposes the latter’s 
inconsistencies.   
 
In terms of institution building, Russia substantively mimics Western political institutions at domestic 
and international levels. At the domestic level, the Russian state Duma resembles Western parliaments 
in form, but in practice has become a rubber-stamp body for the executive and is populated by 
government-approved parties that ‘mimic opposition parties’ by channelling votes away from genuine 
opposition.82 This system enables the Russian ‘party of power’, United Russia, to retain dominance 
while rebuffing Western criticisms that Russia is not ‘democratic’. At the international level, Russia 
has instigated the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union, which comprises five former Soviet states 
and is modelled on the regional integrative principles of the European Union.83 According to Lilia 
Shevtsova, one of the explicit aims of this organisation is to ‘counterbalance the EU’.84 In applying 
these institutional forms to non-democratic contexts, this substantive mimicry serves subtly to challenge 
the notion that Western institutional models are universalisable. 
 
Our interview respondents bear witness to this shift from formal to substantive mimicry in Russia’s 
relationship with the West. Interviewees routinely referred to Russian initiatives as shadows of Western 
practices and institutions.  The EEU was compared to the European Union, the CSTO to NATO, and 
the CSTO’s rapid reaction force to its NATO equivalent.85 The obvious conclusion that Russians, in the 
words of a journalist in Dushanbe, ‘copy the Western experience’ is tempered by caveats on how formal 
post-Western mimicry works in substantively post-Soviet terms.86  In total, interviewees made 42 
references to Russian-Western dynamics in Central Asia but a further 67 to post-Soviet remnants of 
Soviet practices/institutions (see figure 1).   
 
Metis in Russia’s Relations with the West 
Although mētis is present in any form of substantive social relations that extend beyond formal process, 
its nature as a necessarily ‘hidden’ transcript makes it difficult to observe in practice. Thus, mētis in 
Russian foreign policy was hinted at by interviewees in Moscow rather than made explicit, which 
indicates a methodological weakness in this study as (unlike our earlier work on Russia and Central 
Asia87) it did not deploy ethnographic methods.  In the post-Soviet space, it is commonplace to speak 
in code about the informalities, inadvertent effects and corruption of formal institutions. In discussing 
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the EEU, one Russian scholar pointed to its malfunctions: ‘What is this body? Does it really implement 
anyone's will? At least for me, it is difficult to say that it implements Russia's will. This body is unable 
to control its activities.’88   
 
Central Asian interviewees noted Russia’s lack of an explicit strategy for Central Asia and its short-
term approach.  A human rights activist in Bishkek contrasted US and Russian approaches as follows: 
‘If the Americans start making friends with someone from the cradle and walk with this person till the 
end [of his life], moulding his consciousness and his environment, then Russians form these relations 
with a sudden lunge [naskokom]’.89 One Kyrgyz journalist working for a Russian media outlet defined 
the ‘Russian approach’ as according to an ‘administrative logic’. ‘You find someone’, he noted, ‘you 
talk to that person, achieve mutual understanding, but where and in what form your proposal will move 
on is a big question. The Russian approach constitutes an administrative pyramid’.90 Such 
administrative pyramids are familiar to elites who grew up in the late-Soviet period with its bureaucratic 
hypertrophy and ‘cynical reason’.91    
 
These findings suggest that Russia is a ‘rising’ power chiefly in its substantive post-Western mimicry, 
though perhaps also in its post-Soviet mētis, through which it is able to re-appropriate Western 
discourses and institutional forms and thereby challenge and subvert Western dominance. While mētis 
in this case shows us how local officials might subvert new projects such as the EEU, it is practices of 
substantive mimicry that are most clearly associated with the emergence of the post-Western. 
Substantive mimicry serves to delegitimise the existing order through the attachment of new meanings 
to old concepts and practices of international relations. In this way, Russia (though by no means only 
Russia) is helping to bring about a post-Western world order.  
 
 
Table 1: Summary of themes identified in analysis Number of 
interviewees citing 
(out of  38) 
 
Total number of 
references in text 
Major descriptive themes (cited by 10 or more 
interviewees) 
Post-Soviet remnants 
Russian activities in Central Asia – general  
Socialisation of Central Asia into Russian culture 
Russia versus the West in Central Asia 
China and Chinese activities in Central Asia 
The Central Asian state 
 
 
 
24 
17 
17 
16 
16 
12 
 
 
67 
46 
35 
42 
35 
19 
Major evaluative and analytical themes (cited by 10 
or more interviewees) 
Negative view of Russia 
Positive view of Russia 
Withdrawal of Russia from Central Asia 
Mimicry of Russia in Central Asia 
Russia as centre, Central Asia as periphery 
Growing role of Russia in Central Asia 
Metis of Russia in Central Asia 
 
 
 
20 
17 
17 
16 
14 
13 
10 
 
 
 
57 
35 
42 
47 
32 
22 
22 
 
                                                          
88 Interview, Russian academic, Moscow, Moscow, June 2013. 
89 Interview, Human Rights activist, Bishkek, November 2013. 
90 Interview, Journalist, Bishkek, November 2013. 
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Central Asia: a postcolonial, post-Western region? 
The Central Asian region exemplifies the convergence of postcolonial and post-Western international 
relations. First, it is a postcolonial region, having been colonised by the Russian Empire in the 
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries.  Second, it is a region with little, and decreasing, Western 
influence. This final section sets out Central Asia as a postcolonial post-Western space, before analysing 
the form and content of the practices of mimicry and mētis reported by interviewees. 
 
Central Asia’s postcolonial aspect is debated by modern historians in terms of whether the Soviet Union, 
as the successor to the Russian Empire in the region, was a colonial empire or a multinational 
modernising state.92  It is widely accepted that the USSR was a hybrid of the two as an ‘affirmative 
action empire’ or ‘empire of nations’.93 However, an increasing number of scholars of Central Asia 
analyse the region’s Soviet history and its independence in colonial and post-colonial terms, including 
revealing the colonial aspects of specifically anti-colonial and internationalist Soviet strategies in 
Central Asia.94  There is surely no dispute that Central Asia was colonised by the Russian Empire in a 
manner largely consistent with the form and content of European imperial conquest.  The important 
question therefore is not whether Central Asia is postcolonial, but when and how it is postcolonial.  
‘Post-imperial remnants’ was the most common descriptive theme in the interviews with 24 
interviewees making reference on 67 occasions.  One Tajik journalist noted that Russia was resurging 
in Tajikistan, not due to genuine closeness or regional commonality but because ‘as it turns out, it is 
very difficult to live without Russia’.95 
 
In terms of Central Asia’s post-Western status, Western influence has been receding since the waves of 
interventions for democratization, development and security assistance of the 1990s and early-2000s. 
Western normative engagement was unsuccessful in fomenting democratic transitions in the region, 
despite the formal mimicry of its constitutions and electoral processes and substantive adoption of 
financial liberalization.  References to Western activities were rare among our interviewees (6 
references by 5 interviewees) and therefore do not even appear in the table, in stark contrast to 
references to Russia (46 by 17) and secondarily China (35 by 16). Given our interviews were conducted 
by an ethnic Russian and specifically addressed Russian foreign policy this is hardly surprising. 
However, the fact that interviewees were almost six times more likely to pivot from Russia to statements 
about China than about the West is telling. Analytical and evaluative statements in our interview data 
mirrored this decline: the West was portrayed as distant, irrelevant and inactive, a fair-weather friend 
that would not assist in times of crisis. One respondent described the prospect of Western involvement 
in the region as ‘just a beautiful idea’.96 Further, where comparisons were made, the Western approach 
to conflict was seen as mired in bureaucracy and proceduralism, based on values considered alien to 
local populations. Russia, by contrast, was considered Central Asia’s true partner, able to act as security 
guarantor and control the influence of other major powers. In the words of one respondent, ‘Everybody 
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knows that, as long as there is a Russian base here, the United States can’t play any kind of big games 
here’.97 Others highlighted Russia’s absolute power in the region: ‘[The President of Tajikistan 
Emomoli] Rahmon can’t not make an agreement with Russia, he can’t alienate Russia. Because Russia 
has its interests here. It can do anything here, including a coup d'état’.98  
 
Accordingly, practices of mimicry and mētis in Central Asia rely heavily on the region’s ambivalent 
relationship with Russia, trapped between nostalgia for what is remembered as the brotherly Soviet-era 
relationship and a growing nationalism that instead recalls a colonial, exploitative past. Core 
postcolonial themes are present in the responses of our interviewees.  In particular, evaluative 
statements of mimicry (47 references by 16 interviewees), centre-periphery relations (32 by 14) and 
mētis (22 by 10) were identified in the transcripts (see table 1).  Negative (20 interviewees) and positive 
(17) views are both common with a majority favouring negative or suspicious views of Russia. 
Similarly, there is debate both over Russia’s withdrawal compared to Soviet times (17) and its post-
Soviet resurgence (13).  Many in the region feel caught between the deep socio-cultural ties that come 
with decades of socialisation into Russian cultural practices and a growing distaste for Russia as a 
political entity. This equivocal relationship between the subaltern and the hegemon breeds practices of 
formal mimicry and mētis – on the one hand unable to reject neo-imperialistic projects outright, but on 
the other disinclined to support them wholeheartedly.  
 
Mimicry in Kyrgyz and Tajik Relations with Russia 
Like Russia’s mimicry of the West, state-level mimicry of Russia in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is 
evident in both institutions and discourses. Russian governmental organisational forms, such as the 
Duma, have been reproduced to varying degrees across the region, and Central Asian legislative 
discourses tend to re-articulate those of Russia.99 However, unlike Russia’s substantive mimicry of 
Western discourses, which serve to undermine Western global hegemony, Kyrgyz and Tajik 
reproductions and rearticulations tend towards emulation. Mimicry thus tends to remain at the formal 
level, unable to re-appropriate the power of the former coloniser.  
 
To consider first institutional mimicry, national parliaments mimic the form of the Russian duma. 
According to one respondent, ‘supposedly we have a parliament, but in reality, there are groups there 
who are lobbying for shadow flows [of money], and as a matter of fact, they are occupied with lobbying 
for their own businesses, and the mandate of an MP is there to give immunity.’100 Another respondent 
called Kyrgyzstan a ‘pseudo-parliamentarian republic.’101 Once created, such institutions, since they 
are not embedded in within a developmental tradition or ensemble of pre-existing supporting 
institutions, invent their own national raison d’être. This echoes the way in which the Russian duma 
mimics Western parliamentary politics; however, unlike Russia, Central Asian states do not seek to 
subvert hegemonic discourses of appropriate domestic political organisation.  The mimicry here is 
formal: it is a superficial emulation of the former imperial master and does not try to rebalance power 
relations or challenge prevailing norms. 
 
Post-Soviet security agencies also retain links and patterns indicating something between deep 
cooperation and institutional isomorphism.  One Dushanbe-based respondent stated, ‘The state security 
and law enforcement agencies are just for show. They demonstrate the invented threat and then fight 
with it themselves.’102  The deep institutional continuities and enduring relations between Central Asian 
state security agencies and Russia’s internal and external security services is one of the main vectors of 
Russia’s relations with its former colonial territories.  Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in particular have 
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successfully prosecuted campaigns against their political enemies based in Russia by orchestrating 
arrests, detentions, illegal formal extraditions, informal renditions and disappearances with the direct 
connivance of the Russian security services.  The CIS’ Minsk Treaty provides some formal provision 
for such cooperation but informally it is eased by customary processes whereby human rights safeguards 
are disregarded.  There are at least 18 public records of Uzbek and Tajik exiles subject to disappearance, 
rendition and assassination with the suspected connivance of the Russian security services between 
2001 and 2016.103 In some cases, Russia acted to arrest Central Asian exiles prior to the formal issues 
of a warrant by the Central Asian security service.  
 
Regarding discursive mimicry, conservative laws adopted in Russia travel quickly to Central Asia, with 
governments adopting their own, often more conservative, versions. For example, the Russian so-called 
Foreign Agents law of July 2012, which requires NGOs receiving foreign funding and conducting 
‘political activities’ to register as ‘foreign agents’ with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and label 
themselves as such on all their print and online materials.104 Similar laws have since been approved in 
Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, but a Kyrgyz version was unexpectedly rejected by the parliament at the 
bill’s final reading in May 2016.  In June 2013, Vladimir Putin signed the so-called ‘Gay Propaganda 
Law’ into the legal codex. This now infamous law, which claims to improve child protection, prohibited 
distribution of ‘propaganda’ about ‘non-traditional sexual relationships’ to minors.105 In January 2015, 
Kazakh deputies debated the addition of a similar clause to child protection legislation, though it was 
ultimately rejected amid fears it could damage the country’s bid to host the 2022 Winter Olympics.106 
In Kyrgyzstan, a more repressive version of the law, which would impose prison sentences instead of 
fines to people referring to homosexuality in public, is currently going through parliament.107   
 
This formal mimicry works both for and against a relationship of colonial dependency with Russia.  On 
one hand, the copying of parliamentary institutions and laws and the deep cooperation between security 
agencies demonstrate how Central Asian states – especially Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – continue the 
economic and security dependencies on Moscow.  On the other hand, such mimicry does not imply 
either exclusive loyalty to Moscow, as it did in Soviet times, or adherence to a shared doctrine or 
ideology of governance. Formal postcolonial Central Asian mimicry therefore does not (yet) have the 
same disruptive potential as substantive post-Western Russian mimicry.  
 
Metis in Kyrgyz and Tajik Relations with Russia 
The practice of mētis demonstrates the practical limits of Russian power in Central Asia: at the level of 
discourse, mētis is visible in the use of local language to protect and make irreducible ‘local knowledge’; 
at the level of practice, what is often termed corruption can also be seen as mētis, since it is conducted 
through local clientelistic networks typically invisible to outsiders. As with Russia, our interview data 
on mētis is less strong given that it is often invisible without direct observation.  However, unlike in 
Russia, in Central Asia it appeared to comprise a central aspect of everyday relations with the hegemon. 
Our respondents speak of mētis as they report the disintegration of Soviet institutional and ideological 
foundations that has left an environment fertile for the subversion of projects.  As one respondent 
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lamented, ‘contemporary Kyrgyz people don’t work, there is no proletariat, agriculture is in decline, 
everybody is moving to the city, there is no work here. Clerks steal everything. Politicians do the same. 
The youth is either leaving [the country] or joining organized crime…’108  
 
While numerous respondents noted the slow decline of the Russian language in Central Asian public 
life as a regrettable loss, others saw it as a source of opportunity, as it enabled Central Asians to express 
discontent with Russia without being understood and chastised for it. ‘I always say, guys, just 
understand one thing: the local people often lie in the Russian language...,’ one Central Asian 
respondent noted. ‘For example, the migrants coming back are afraid to find fault with [scold/criticise] 
Russia in Russian – they are afraid that someone will spot them, register in some kind of book, black 
list – while in their own language it is possible.’109 Corroborating this, other respondents in Tajikistan 
noted that a critical discourse of Russia in the public sphere is completely absent. However, social media 
is used to publicise incidents of violence against Central Asian migrants in Russia: ‘when something 
negative happens, it goes viral, becomes frantically shared, liked, tweeted, and these social networks 
become a powerful tool to influence public consciousness.’110 
 
What is often dismissed as corruption may also be understood as mētis.  Order controls and trading 
regulations are frequently manipulated or even ignored by influential traders working on the re-export 
of goods of Chinese goods to Russia and other Central Asian states. It is the local knowledge of informal 
bureaucratic practices, and the subaltern agency of controlling those practices, that enables such 
manipulation to occur.  ‘They bring in 10 billion, but declare only 2 billion, while the other eight billion 
is being re-absorbed,’ noted one interviewee. ‘This practically is smuggling. This is what the whole 
[import/export] structure has been built on.’111 Such practices are reported as widespread in economic 
exchange with the former colonial power: ‘Russian companies’, reports another interviewee, ‘faced the 
necessity to include into the budget money to be paid to the local elite.’ The respondent, recalling the 
process of applying for Russian-funded grants, laments, ‘While knowing that the project will cost 3-3.5 
million roubles, we ask for 8, we get 3.5 and the rest we must write off so that the people who give this 
money can keep it. And it’s always like this.’112 
 
Inevitably, this collaboration between native elites and former colonial power for personal and familial 
gains creates resentment from those excluded from the kick-backs offered by Russian contractors.  This 
is the other side of mētis in Scott’s analysis – that is, practical knowledge not just working for the 
maintenance of hierarchies through the completion of state projects but in its cunning containing the 
basis for the project’s subversion.   In Kyrgyzstan, the one country in Central Asia where a significant 
political opposition exists, these stories have become scandals that opponents of the government use to 
mobilize protests both in the capital and regions against the state.  They become wedges that threaten 
the elite’s control of its population. In recounting a story of a Russian-funded project in southern 
Kyrgyzstan one NGO worker in Osh remarked, they ‘invest a lot of money, but there are few results. 
And the state too, they don’t invest, they try to administrate, but there are few results from them too, 
because everything is kept within the structure (formalizovano) of the state’.113  Such corruption is so 
commonplace that some projects become more about the rent-seeking opportunities than about the 
strategic and infrastructural objectives.114 
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The post-Soviet aspect of this corruption is well-documented in both its routine (petty) and spectacular 
(grand) manifestations.  Alena Ledeneva analyses a sistema of informal clientelist networks, integral to 
how Russia is governed, which have evolved from the Soviet period and adapted to global capitalism.115  
Karen Dawisha demonstrates how the economy came to be controlled by Putin’s network after he 
moved successfully to co-opt or control Russia’s ‘oligarchs’ of the 1990s.116 But it is important to 
recognise that what appears to be specifically post-Soviet is globally post-Western.  Cases from both 
Russia and Central Asia demonstrate that the offshore financial system is integral to grand corruption 
as it enables mobility, security and secrecy for monies earned from resource capture.  As Alexander 
Cooley and John Heathershaw show, Central Asia is just as much part of this de-centred system as any 
other world region with a global network which connects London and New York to Moscow, Bishkek 
and Dushanbe via the British Virgin Islands, the Caymans, Cyprus, Gibraltar, Guernsey, and Hong 
Kong among other places.117  Thus, we find the profits of Tajik aluminium – estimated at a quarter of 
Tajik GDP over the period from 2005-2015 –  transferred to BVI accounts and its disputes with the 
Russian Aluminium company adjudicated in UK and Swiss courts.118  More globally still, Kyrgyzstan’s 
Asia-Universal Bank was set up as a node in the global financial system with tens of billions of dollars 
flowing in and out of the company to/from offshore accounts from Belize to New Zealand in the few 
years of its existence before the fall of Bakiev regime in 2010.119  
 
Conclusions: towards area studies of global politics 
The evidence presented here demonstrates that post-Western international relations are present in 
Russian foreign policy and Central Asian affairs to varying degrees.  These are two distinct modes of 
the post-Western which are related but must not be conflated.  First, as discussed in Section Three and 
as has been widely observed elsewhere, Russia substantively mimics the West as a post-imperial state, 
and challenges commonly accepted meanings of the key concepts and practices of the international 
community.120  Russia’s strength in the international system means it does not have to resort so 
frequently to practices of metis vis-à-vis Western hegemonic projects, but can instead employ 
substantive mimicry to undermine their legitimacy and expose their inconsistencies. The post-Western 
condition thus implies a greater amount of agency and subversive capacity than the postcolonial 
condition, at least in the context of Russia and Central Asia. 
 
Second, as argued in Section Four, there are formal mimicry and mētis with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s 
relations with the former colonial power.  Central Asia is a region emerging as properly post-Western 
in its rejection both of the Russian/Soviet past and the Western-sponsored ‘transition’ process of the 
1990s.   Russia’s international relations in this region underline the acceptance of its neo-colonial 
projects on the surface alongside a subtle but firm resistance to full-fledged Russian hegemony, which 
occasionally leads to push-backs.121 Relations between Russia and it postcolonies, as articulated by our 
interviewees, are ones based on ambivalence.  Nascent discourses of mimicry and basic practices of 
mētis reflect, on the one hand, disillusionment with Russia and, on the other, dependence on it, echoing 
the postcolonial experience more broadly. To borrow from Moore, these relations equivocate ‘between 
the desire for autonomy and a history of dependence, between the desire for autochthony and the fact 
                                                          
Kyrgyzstan’, Central Asian Survey, Volume 34 (1), 2015, pp. 46-56; Kemel Toktomushev, ‘Regime security, 
base politics and rent-seeking: the local and global political economies of the American air base in Kyrgyzstan, 
2001–2010’, Central Asian Survey, Volume 34 (1), 2015, pp. 57-77.  
115 Alena Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal Governance, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
116 Karen Dawisha, Putin's Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014). 
117 Cooley & Heathershaw, Dictators Without Borders 
118 Ibid., pp.95-101 
119 Ibid., pp.153-157 
120 Morozov, Russia’s Postcolonial Identity; Zarakol, After Empire. 
121 See, for example, Kyrgyzstan’s American airbase (2001-14), which was continued against Russia’s wishes, 
and Tajikistan rejection of Russian investment in favour of Chinese and even Western commerce (especially 
after the summit between Putin and Rahmon in 2005). 
DRAFT  
 
19 
 
of hybrid part-colonial origin, between resistance and complicity, between imitation (or mimicry) and 
originality’.122 
 
These two modes of the post-Western together enable us to sketch out an analytical framework which 
is global without being specifically Western.  Four remarks may be made by way of conclusion 
regarding the theoretical import of the postcolonial mode of the post-Western.  The first three of these 
are ontological and a fourth methodological.  Firstly, this analytical path enables us to shift the focus 
away from the Western vs non-Western dyad that is the primary focus in analyses of international 
politics, to relations between, entanglements of, and collaboration among these actors at a global scale.  
Mimicry and mētis are globally instantiated phenomena even when they have specific manifestations 
in great power politics (Russia’s EEU project simultaneously mimicking and competing with the EU) 
and regional affairs (Central Asian extraction industries incorporation into the global offshore 
networks).  Secondly, the dual focus on the postcolonial state as object and its constitutive elite as agents 
accurately reflects the embedded nature of agency. It decentres analysis away from an exclusive focus 
on the state as institution to the elite networks that flow through the state.  Thirdly, mimicry and mētis 
are concepts within post-Western structures that are global.  There is not a country in the world that has 
not been touched by colonialism, either as coloniser or colonised. They therefore allow the possible for 
commensurable claims and shared conversations about global politics upon which to begin the 
construction of theories. As discussed above, the alternative to this approach is either to accept the 
inevitably imperial optic of IR or embark on a conception of IR as comparative regional studies, as the 
proponents of non-Western IR imply.  Fourthly, the concepts demand methodologies which pay 
attention to practice. Mimicry, as an elite practice, is primarily accessible through the discourse at the 
postcolonial state level, evident in the rationale given for the development of laws, political institutions 
and foreign policy decisions. Mētis, as the practice of citizens, can be uncovered through ethnographic 
fieldwork and participant observation.  A modest attempt in this direction has been attempted in this 
paper, but a great deal of possible mētis was invisible to this study due to the methods used. 
 
As our modest and illustrative study has shown, mimicry and mētis, although features of the 
postcolonial form of post-Western IR, are not necessarily markers of the decolonisation of international 
politics. There are variations in the extent of the postcolonial, as is evident in our partial examples of 
mimicry and mētis. Like modernities, postcolonial relations are not simply multiple but asymmetrically 
entangled.123  There are methodological and epistemological challenges found in this entanglement: in 
the need to incorporate the micro with the macro, and to do so in a manner that is able to capture the 
different strands of the postcolonial.  The combination of ethnographic fieldwork with discourse 
analysis is hard to achieve without a focus on a particular region and its languages at the expense of 
other neighbourhoods of the post-Western world and other manifestations of the postcolonial 
conditions.  This is an immense challenge of research design and its limits. Collaborative research for 
the co-production of knowledge internationally (often between major Western universities and 
institutions and independent researchers of the ‘non-West’) is both a moral and practical necessity. In 
its research design, ontologically and methodologically, a postcolonially informed post-Western IR 
must be reflexive, that is, able to reflect on the problems of ethnocentrism without discarding the claim 
to universal value.124 
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